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I. Introduction 
 
The complexities of global supply chains, and the challenges of managing them, have never 
been greater. A number of recent events have shown the ways in which global supply chains are 
far more interconnected, and fragile, that commonly thought. The tsunami that struck Japan in 
2011 disrupted automobile production worldwide.2 Floods in Thailand in late 2011 disrupted the 
worldwide supply of hard drives.3 What is truly shocking about these incidents is the fact that 
relatively local, isolated events can have a pronounced global effect on the entire world supply 
chain for every product in an industry. Many companies were not aware how vulnerable their 
supply chains were prior to these incidents.4 This lack of knowledge related to supply chain 
vulnerability to disasters shows the way in which companies may have a shallow knowledge of 
the exact origins of components of their products or their products themselves. 
Many people assume that companies can easily identify every item in their supply chains and 
all component parts, perhaps all the way back to raw materials. Recent incidents make it clear, 
however, that for many companies the length of their supply chain knowledge is the end of the 
arms length transaction with a supplier. For instance, Pratt & Whitney, a division of United 
                                                      
1 JD/MBA Candidate 2013, Michigan State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Bruce Bean 
for his guidance and feedback as my advisor for this paper. I would also like to thank Professor Kevin Saunders who 
provided helpful comments on this paper. Finally, I wish to thank Achille Mutombo, an LLM Fulbright scholar at 
MSU College of Law, who was kind enough to share his paper on how local miners in the Congo who are not 
involved in any conflict are harmed by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
2 Robert Wright, Supply Chain: Tsunami, Floods, and Storms Move Logistics Up the Agenda, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
January 24, 2012, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/754e8758-407a-11e1-9bce-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2Mn8TYGLd.  
3 Id.  
4Kathleen Ellis, The Aftershocks of Vulnerable Supply Chains, INSURANCE JOURNAL, June 27, 2011, available at: 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/06/27/204170.htm. 
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Technologies, recently began investigating its supply chain after it was discovered that one of its 
subsidiaries falsified test results regarding titanium quality for airplane parts.5 The falsifications 
took place over 15 years and are expected to include more than 40,000 parts.6 Similarly, in a 
widely reported story, Apple supplier Foxconn has been accused of various worker abuses 
including the use of underage labor and unsafe working conditions, which apple would, 
presumably, never allow.7 
The difficulty of tracing source materials and ensuring those materials comply with 
prescribed specifications can be difficult – and the consequences widespread. This is exemplified 
perfectly in the recent scandal in Europe in which horse meat was found in ground beef in meals 
served at restaurants, schools, and hospitals, as well as in frozen supermarket meals.8 This 
scandal, though likely not a significant health risk, has worried consumers across the globe.9 
Similarly, several years ago, consumers were also concerned about lead paint that was found in 
US children’s toys that were manufactured in China.10 
What these incidents show is that, while a company may have the best of intentions regarding 
the management of its supply chain, there is still a great deal of complexity, and uncertainty, in 
the supply chain. Many companies operate on an “arm’s length” model without knowledge of the 
conduct of their suppliers. The aforementioned incidents show that companies do, in fact, need to 
                                                      
5 Brian Dowling, Pratt Reviewing Five Engine Types with Titanium Parts, THE HARTFORD COURANT, February 26, 
2013, available at: http://www.courant.com/business/hc-pratt-whitney-western-titanium-20130226-
1,0,1784531.story. 
6 Brian Dowling, Pratt: Fraudulent Engine-Testing Scheme Uncovered in 2011, THE HARTFORD COURANT, March 
4, 2013, available at: http://www.courant.com/business/hc-utc-pratt-and-whitney-testing-scheme-
20130304,0,3311317.story. 
7 Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs are Built into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, (January 25, 2012), 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-
workers-in-china.html?_r=0. 
8 Michael Lee, Q&A: Could the European horse meat scandal spread to the US?, THE WASHINGTON POST, February 
28, 2013, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/qanda-could-the-european-horse-meat-
scandal-spread-to-the-us/2013/02/28/20405510-81e3-11e2-a671-0307392de8de_story.html. 
9 Id. 
10 Eric S. Lipton & David Barboza, As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/business/worldbusiness/19toys.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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deepen their supply chain knowledge. However, when one considers that the average Dell 
computer contains hundreds of component parts from more than a dozen countries, the 
magnitude and expense of examining every tiny amount of material in each part comes into 
view.11 
 Rather than letting the market forces control this process, a variety of new laws are intended 
to require corporate social responsibility activities and mandate deep supply chain knowledge. A 
little-noticed provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, and the resulting SEC-promulgated rule, require 
companies to disclose the country of origin for certain minerals used in their products.12 
Similarly, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act requires retailers and manufacturers 
with gross receipts of greater than $100 million who do business in the State of California to 
disclose what they are doing to prevent slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains.13 
These laws are in addition to increased enforcement actions under the United States Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 which each impose additional burdens 
further down the supply chain for alleged bribery.14 
The California Act and Section 1502 have laudable goals – stopping the genocide and civil 
war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and eradicating human trafficking. While this 
paper may be critical of the ways in which these laws go about attempting to achieve those goals, 
nothing here is intended to imply these goals should not be pursued. Rather, the paper seeks to 
address the difficulties in compliance at a time when companies don’t always have enough basic 
supply chain knowledge to react to natural disasters and ways in which each of these laws could 
                                                      
11 Christopher G. Campbell & Laura T. Vogel, Five Tips for Preventing Problems, 52 NO. 7 DRI FOR DEF 85 (2010). 
12 See Dodd-Frank §1502, 15 U.S.C. S78m(p) (West 2013). 
13 See Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2013). 
14 John Rupp et. al., The Briber Act and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Potential Traps for the Unwary in 
Corporate Transactions, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRACTITIONER CONTRIBUTIONS (2012), available at: 
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/the-bribery-act-and-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-
potential-traps-for-the-unwary-in-corporate-transactions-by-john-rupp-ian-redfearn-and-mark-herman-covington-
burling-llp/. 
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be made more effective while simultaneously putting less of a burden on private enterprise. Both 
of these laws, rather than setting specific prohibitions for the use of conflict minerals or forced 
labor, instead follow what some commentators have called a  “name-and-shame” approach.15 
The effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of this approach will also be discussed. 
This paper will discuss who is affected by these laws, what the laws require, the projected 
compliance costs, as well as who the enforcing agencies will be. It will explore potential 
problems and unintended consequences stemming from these laws. It will also examine what 
may be more effective ways of reaching the purported goals of each of these laws. Finally, this 
paper will offer practical advice for companies that may be required to comply with the reporting 
requirements of these laws. 
 
II. The Dodd-Frank, Act Section 1502 
a. Who is affected and what does Section 1502 require? 
i. Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed largely in response to corporate securities trading fraudulent 
scandals, contained a provision unrelated to preventing financial fraud. This provision mandates 
disclosure of the purchase of certain minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
other neighboring countries known as “Covered Countries.”16 This disclosure requirement held 
that any corporation required to file reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must also 
file a report regarding its use so-called conflict minerals if those minerals are “necessary to the 
functionality or production of a product manufactured by such [corporation].”17 The rule further 
                                                      
15 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role As Diplomatic and Humanitarian 
Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1344 (2012). 
16 See Dodd-Frank §1502, 15 U.S.C. S78m(p) (West 2013). 
17 Id. 
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directs the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate regulations for annual disclosure 
of whether conflict minerals are necessary and, if so, to submit a report detailing if those 
minerals originate from a Covered Country.18 While the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
the most often mentioned in connection with this rule, and in this paper, it seems worth 
mentioning that the other Covered Countries are Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.19 
The impact of this rule is perhaps shown by the volume of the public comments in response 
to the proposed rule. The SEC received thousands of comments regarding the proposed rule for 
the conflict minerals provision.20 As Karen Woody notes in her article Conflict Minerals 
Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, the SEC first 
issued proposed regulations in December 2010.21 After receiving thousands of comments and 
holding a roundtable discussion, as well as conducting economic analysis, the SEC issued the 
final rule on August 22, 2012.22 
ii. The Final Rule 
The final rule holds that any company required to file reports under Section 13(a) or Section 
15(d) of the 1934 Act is required to comply with the rule.23 For the purposes of this paper, 
companies that must comply with this law will be referred to as “Issuers” or “Covered 
Companies.” The rule expressly notes that domestic companies, foreign private issuers, and 
smaller reporting companies can all be “Covered Companies.”24 This rule, limited by the 
                                                      
18 Id. 
19 Jane C. Luxton, The New SEC Conflict Minerals Rule Challenge in Compliance, 16 NO. 11 
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 1 (2012). 
20 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian 
Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2012). 
21 Id. at 1328. 
22 Id. 
23 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,287 (Sep. 12, 2012). 
24 Id. 
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jurisdiction of the SEC, appears to create a potential business situation in which public reporting 
companies are placed at a disadvantage when compared to non-reporting companies. The costs 
of complying with current securities laws, both in financial terms and in terms of complexity 
have been well documented and need not be recited here.25 The conflict minerals provision adds 
yet another cost and a great deal of complexity for issuers. 
It also seems probable that, while not required strictly to comply with the Final Rule, many 
companies will nonetheless have to comply because companies they supply are forced to 
comply.26 For instance, if a company is a Covered Company that is forced to comply, and it has 
suppliers who need not comply, the Covered Company is likely to demand the non-Covered 
Company’s assistance in complying with the rule and tracing the original of any covered 
minerals. In fact, many non-public companies have already begun receiving letters from their 
customers requesting such assistance in complying with Section 1502.27 
The SEC’s final rule begins a three-part analysis that determines the applicability of the 
rule.28 For the first step, an issuer must determine whether it is subject to the requirements of the 
conflict minerals provisions.29 Those who are required to comply are those for whom “conflict 
minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a product manufactured by such 
person.”30 If an issuer does not meet this definition, there is nothing further it needs to do. No 
                                                      
25 For a discussion of compliance costs related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, see generally William C. Carney, 
The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private”, 55 EMORY L. J. 141 (2006). 
26 Jane C. Luxton, The New SEC Conflict Minerals Rule Challenge in Compliance, 16 NO. 11 
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 1 (2012). 
27 Jane C. Luxton, The New SEC Conflict Minerals Rule Challenge in Compliance, 16 NO. 11 
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 1 (2012). 
28 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sep. 12, 2012). 
29 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,279. 
30 Id. 
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disclosure is required.31 If an issuer does meet this requirement, it must proceed to the second 
step.32 
The second step requires an issuer to conduct a reasonable country of origin inquiry 
regarding the origin of conflict minerals.33 To satisfy this requirement, an issuer must conduct an 
inquiry regarding the origin of its conflict minerals that is reasonably designed to determine 
“whether any of its conflict minerals originated in Covered Countries.”34 This inquiry must also 
be undertaken in good faith.35 If, after the inquiry, the issuers knows or reasonably believes that 
the minerals did not originate in one of the conflict countries, the issuer must then prepare a 
specialized disclosure report to briefly describe the reasonable country of origin it used in the 
inquiry.36 Noticeably absent from this rule is what would constitute a “reasonably inquiry” under 
this step. 
If the issuer has knowledge or reason to believe that the minerals originated in a prohibited 
country, the issuer must move to the third step.37 This step requires an issuer to exercise due 
diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict materials using a nationally or 
internationally recognized framework.38 During this process, the issuer should attempt to 
determine if its minerals originated from a listed country but did not support or benefit armed 
groups.39 If an issuer cannot state that its minerals did not originate from a Covered Country or 
                                                      
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,280. Conflict minerals are defined in the final rules as including 
cassiterite, columbite-tantalite, gold, wolframite, and their derivates. Id. at 56,285. The definition may also be 
expanded if the Secretary of State determines that additional minerals are financing the armed conflict in Covered 
Countries. Id. 
34 Jane C. Luxton, The New SEC Conflict Minerals Rule Challenge in Compliance, 16 NO. 11 
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 1 (2012). 
35 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,280. 
36 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281. 
37 Id. 
38 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,326. 
39 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,317 
9 
 
recycled or scrap sources, the issuer must provide a Conflict Minerals Report.40 The Conflict 
Minerals report must include a description of the due diligence taken, along with a description of 
the facilities used to process the conflict materials, the country of origin of the conflict minerals, 
and the efforts to determine the mine or location of original of the minerals.41 The issuer must 
also have the report audited.42 
The due diligence required The Conflict Minerals report, if necessary, must be filed as an 
exhibit to the Form SD.43 The Form SD is the form promulgated by the SEC to be used by 
companies to report the information required by the Final Rule.44 
If the due diligence does show that the minerals are conflict-free, the Conflict Minerals 
Report need not be filed but the Issuer’s Form SD must include description of the due diligence 
and how the results shows the minerals are conflict-free.45 
Interestingly, the aforementioned disclosure on Form SD only includes indexing on EDGAR, 
the SEC’s document management system.46 There is no requirement that the company disclose 
his information in any other place. This would tend to suggest that Section 1502 is targeted 
primarily toward investors as there is no requirement for disclosure in a place readily visited by 
consumers. 
iii. Transition Period 
The final rule also includes a temporary transition period during which issuers need not 
disclose if their products contain conflict minerals or not but may instead include the designation 
                                                      
40 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281, 56,361. 
41 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,321. 
42 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,320. 
43 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281. 
44 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,301. 
45 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,320. In addition to the Final Rule, for a useful summary about the 
new SEC Form SD that is used for disclosure under the Conflict Minerals Final Rule, see  
46 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,301. 
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“DRC conflict undeterminable.”47 This distinction can be used if, after reasonable inquiry, the 
issuer cannot determine if the minerals are from a Covered Country or if the minerals financed or 
benefited armed groups in a covered country.48 This distinction can also be used if, after 
reasonable inquiry, an issuer was unable to determine if the minerals originated in a covered 
country.49 However, if the issuer knows that the conflict minerals directly or indirectly financed 
or benefited an armed group in the Covered Countries, the “DRC conflict undeterminable” 
designation may not be used.50 The transition period is two years for all issuers and four years for 
smaller reporting companies.51 
It appears that the transition period will be needed. A survey of American companies shows 
that just 11.3% of manufacturers with 17.1% of the electronics market had information on 
conflict minerals in their supply chains available as of November 2012.52 
b. Compliance Costs 
Karen Woody conducts a thorough survey of the estimates of compliance costs in her 
article. The SEC estimate for the cost of compliance for those affected is approximately $3 to 4 
billion to develop initial compliance programs.53 The SEC estimated that the yearly compliance 
costs would be approximately $207 to $609 million.54 In stark contrast to the SEC prediction, 
predictably, is the National Association of Manufacturers’ estimate which puts the cost of initial 
compliance between $9 and 16 billion.55 
                                                      
47Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 56,282 
52 Sri Jegarajah, Conflict Minerals in Your Mobile – Why Congo’s War Matters, CNBC, (November 26, 2012), 
available at: http://www.cnbc.com/id/49961559. 
53 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian 
Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1333 (2012); Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,334. 
54 Id. 
55 National Association of Manufacturers, Testimony of Franklin Vargo, Vice President, International Economic 
Affairs, National Association of Manufacturers before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee 
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Between these numbers is a Tulane study that performed an analysis of the economic 
model used by the SEC, as well as the model used by the National Association of 
Manufacturers.56 The study found that the model used by the SEC likely underestimated the cost 
of compliance, whereas the model used by the National Association of Manufacturers likely 
overestimated.57 A third model, utilized by the study, places the cost of compliance at $7.93 
billion initially.58 One of the central differences in the third model is that it notes that many of 
the compliance costs will be borne by suppliers to issuers, as opposed to the issuers themselves, 
and, as such, a single supplier may serve multiple issuers which would reduce the total cost of 
compliance.59 
c. Unintended Consequences 
Regardless of which model is used, it is obvious that complying with the SEC rule will be 
hugely expensive for American companies. The Tulane study makes an interesting comment on 
the projected costs of compliance noting that the nearly $8 billion in compliance costs, “must be 
viewed relative to the size of the industries that depend on these minerals – including industrial, 
aerospace, healthcare, automotive, chemicals, electronics/high-tech, retail and jewelry sectors – 
and the trillions of dollars in wealth creation these sections combined generate.”60 While it is true 
that the sectors that are affected account for trillions of dollars in revenue, the aforementioned 
revenue does not necessarily mean profits. The SEC rule has the short-term effect of increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                              
on International Monetary Policy and Trade, on “The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: 
Impacts on American and the Congo, May 10, 2012, available at: 
http://www.nam.org/~/media/D22FDCF63D134B6D9A973DEADDB17D30/Conflict_Minerals_Testimony.pdf 
56 Chris Bayer, A Critical Analysis of the SEC and NAM Economic Impact Models and the Proposal of a 3rd Model 
in View of the Implementation of Section 1502 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank  Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS (October 12, 2011), available at: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/tulane-study.pdf. 
57 Id. at 2. 
58 Id. at 32. 
59 Id. at 12. 
60 Id. at 32. 
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raw material acquisition prices for a variety of suppliers. These costs will either cut into the 
profit margins of the affected companies or, perhaps more likely, will increase the costs of 
American products which contain these materials.  
i. A Competitive Disadvantage 
It doesn’t seem difficult to argue that the SEC Rule amounts to a de facto tax on all products 
containing Conflict Minerals that are produced by Covered Companies. Curiously, and also 
problematically, this rule would appear to also put companies who are required to file reports 
under the 1934 Act at a competitive disadvantage compared to companies that are not subject to 
reporting requirements. If a company does not have to report, it needn’t invest the time and 
capital in attempting to comply with these rules. It can continue to source from the cheapest 
possible supplier. 
In addition to the ways in which companies may be placed at a competitive disadvantage, 
some companies also worry about the loss of a competitive advantage because of Section 1502. 
Information about a company’s supply chain and its sourcing can often form the basis for a 
competitive advantage. For instance, some suppliers in the automotive sector who have been 
under tremendous pressure to obtain a cost competitive advantage wherever possible are worried 
that disclosure of information under the final SEC rule may in fact mean that they are required to 
disclose some details about their supply chains. 61 These details, if broadly disseminated, would 
allow competitors to learn the ways in which they have been able to reduce costs.62 
ii. Potato Chip Compliance 
The final rule also does not contain a de minimis threshold which would allow for an 
exemption for products which contain a trace amount of conflict minerals. This means that a 
                                                      
61 Dustin Walsh, African Violence Touches Automotive Supply Chain; Conflict Minerals Increases Costs, Red Tape, 
CRAIN’S BUSINESS DETROIT (Sep. 24, 2012). 
62 Id. 
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wide array of products fall under the scope of the final rule. For instance, a bag of potato chips 
could be regulated under the final rule because the bag will often contain a trace amount of tin. 
One article notes that companies like Frito Lay have attempted to argue that their products 
should be exempt from compliance.63  The SEC notes that by not including a de minimis 
exception even minute or trace amounts could trigger the need to disclose, however it defends its 
decision not to include a de minimis threshold by noting that disclosure would not be required 
unless the conflict mineral was necessary to the functionality of the product.64 This, of course, all 
begs the question, “What is the functionality of a bag of potato chips?” 
iii. A de facto Embargo and Chinese Monopoly 
As previously discussed, compliance is prohibitively expensive. If a company were 
economically rational, it would most likely try to avoid these costs, and therefore minerals, 
entirely. The Dodd-Frank provisions and the SEC rule have created a de facto embargo where 
few US companies are purchasing any minerals from the Congo.65 At first blush this may seem a 
good result – if no US companies are purchasing minerals from the armed groups, then those 
groups should be financially devastated. The problem is that the armed groups are not operating 
the mines and selling minerals directly. Much of the mining in the Congo is done by small, 
artisanal miners who would usually sell their minerals to legitimate manufacturers.66 Because 
these miners can no longer sell to legitimate manufacturers, they are forced to sell their minerals 
on the black market, which may be of greater benefit to the armed groups.67 Because some 
miners are unable to sell their minerals to anyone, many mines have suspended operations 
                                                      
63Heath E. Combs, Laws Require Corporate Social Responsibility, FURNITURE TODAY, March 5, 2012. 
64 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,298. 
65 Jeremy C. Jeffrey, Tungsten is Forever: Conflict Minerals, Dodd-Frank, and the Need for a European Response, 
18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503 (2012). 
66 Id. at 510. 
67 Id. 
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entirely.68 Additionally, those miners who are still producing minerals are receiving prices 
twenty to thirty percent less for their minerals.69 Some have suggested that the increasing rates of 
joblessness have actually helped the armed groups recruit because fewer Congolese actually have 
jobs now.70 
China appears to be attempting to strengthen its ties with the Congolese government, thus 
ensuring a steady supply of minerals. China has also sought to strengthen its relationship with the 
Congolese with a $6 billion resources-for-infrastructure agreement.71 Needless to say, the fact 
that prices have fallen in the Congo has also been favorable to the Chinese buyers. Predictably, 
these factors have led to the Chinese having a near monopoly on Congolese minerals.72 
The goals of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act are laudable, even if these goals don’t 
belong in the realm of corporate law. However, the execution of the laws shows that there are 
major flaws. The costs of compliance stand to be high, whereas the benefits appear to be 
questionable. It seems safe to assume that the United States Congress did not intend to give the 
Chinese a virtual monopoly on conflict minerals at a bargain price. It also seems likely that 
potato chip manufacturers were not intended to be included in the law the same way that cell 
phone manufacturers are included. Yet, these are the unintended consequences of Section 1502. 
Later in this paper, these issues will be revisited with potential improvements to the law. 
d. The SEC? Really? 
As anyone with a passing familiarity with securities regulation would have no doubt 
noticed by now, Section 1502 represents a radical departure from the traditional duties of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. As one commentator notes, Section 1502 represents “a 
                                                      
68 Mary Kay Magistad, Why Chinese Mineral Buyers are Eyeing the Congo, PUBLIC RADIO INTERNATIONAL’S THE 
WORLD, October 26, 2011, available at: http://www.theworld.org/2011/10/chinese-conflict-minerals-congo/. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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historic shift away from the SEC’s mission to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”73 Mark K. Neville, in an article for the 
Journal of International Taxation, went as far as calling Section 1502 and related regulations 
part of a “miscellaneous grab bag at the tail end of this [Dodd-Frank] massive financial crisis 
legislation.”74   
The test usually used to determine if something should be required for disclosure to the 
SEC was if such information would be considered “material” to the average investor.75 While 
this information may be important from a humanitarian perspective, it is not included in what has 
traditionally been considered material for purposes of SEC disclosure. It could no doubt be 
important to individual investors if a company uses conflict minerals, however if the materiality 
standard were expanded in this way to include any humanitarian factors that a subgroup of 
investors may consider important, it seems that materiality would include virtually every 
decision regarding every aspect of a company. The ways in which disclosures could expand 
seems limitless: If a company keeps animals for any reason, are those animals humanely treated? 
For that matter, is an animal used anywhere in the supply chain? Does a company use energy 
from exclusively renewable sources? Does a company buy only union-made goods? It could be 
argued that because the conflicts minerals are required to be necessary to the functionality of the 
product to mandate disclosure, the information is useful to a rationale investor because the 
supply of these minerals is subject to disruption. However, expanding the definition of 
materiality in this way could require disclosure of anything necessary to the production process – 
cardboard for packaging, electricity used to run factories, and essentially any related production 
                                                      
73 David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using Securities Law to Address 
Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 330 (2011).  
74 Mark K. Neville, Jr., ‘Diamonds are a Warlord’s Best Friend’ – Enforcing Human Rights in the Supply Chain, 23 
JITAX, 19, 20 (2012). 
75 See generally Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1985). 
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input. The materiality standard, articulated in Basic v. Levinson, provides a much more useful, 
and practical, threshold.76 
While the disclosure of this information may have a positive impact in helping 
companies, it flies in the face of what has traditionally been the mission of the SEC. In addition 
to charging the SEC with a duty for which it was not created, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act also sets up a slippery slope wherein the SEC is used to accomplish political and other social 
goals. There is no limit to what issuers could be forced to disclose, and no limit to the Federal 
powers over corporations. 
III. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
Section 1502 is not the only recent regulation that mandates supply chain knowledge. 
California has often been recognized as a “leader” in corporate regulatory law. Continuing this 
trend, California recently passed the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (the 
“California Act”).77 The Act, which took effect on January 1, 2012, requires companies to 
disclose certain information on their efforts to combat forced labor and human trafficking. 78 The 
California Act is similar to a piece of legislation which failed to pass the United States 
Congress.79 While these bills are different from one another and Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, they both have the common method of requiring companies to disclose their efforts in an 
attempt to encourage compliance with desired human rights standards. 
  A. Who is affected and what is required? 
 The California Act requires that “every retail seller and manufacturer doing business” in 
California with worldwide gross receipts in excess of one hundred million dollars is subject to 
                                                      
76 Id. 
77 Jonathan Todres, The Private Sector’s Pivotal Role in Combating Human Trafficking, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 80, 
81 (2012). 
78 Id. at 82. 
79 Id. at 82 
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the disclosure provisions of this law.80 With regard to “doing business” in California, it is 
defined as any company that is “actively engaging in any transactions for the purposes of 
financial or pecuniary gain or profit” and is organized or domiciled in the state, it has California 
income tax in excess of $500,000, has real or personal property in the state that exceeds $50,000, 
or the amount the corporations pays as compensation in the state is greater than $50,000.81 Gross 
receipts essentially means the total sales of a company with any accounting adjustments or 
reductions for cost of goods sold.82 Whether or not a company is a “manufacturer” or “retailer 
seller” depends on the principal business activity code it files on its California tax return.83 
Given the relatively broad meaning of the definition of affected companies shown above, 
the regulation is clearly sweeping, or perhaps sweepingly overreaching. It is estimated that 3,200 
companies are directly affected by the regulation.84 What gives the regulation broader effect, 
however, is the fact that the wholesalers and distributors for those companies, regardless of their 
size, will be asked to comply indirectly if their customers are required to disclose.85 Much like 
Section 1502, there is a domino effect down the supply chain that requires companies to comply 
or face the loss of customers. 
For the companies that are required to comply, the requirements of the law are fairly 
straightforward. A company is required to disclose its efforts to “eradicate slavery and human 
trafficking from its direct supply chain for tangible goods offered for sale.”86 The disclosure 
should include a description of the company’s actions for each of the following: 1) engages in 
                                                      
80 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2013). 
81 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(a)(2)(A) (West 2013). This incorporates by reference Cal.Rev. & T. Code § 23101 (West 
2013). 
82 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(a)(2)(A) (West 2013).. This incorporates by reference Cal.Rev. & T. Code § 25120 
(West 2013). 
83 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(a)(2)(C) & (D) (West 2013). 
84 Melissa Harman, How Will California’s supply chain law affect you?, SAN FERNANDO BUS. J. 69 (June 25, 2012). 
85 Id. 
86 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2013). 
18 
 
verification of product supply chains, 2) conducts audits of suppliers to evaluable compliance 
with company standards for human trafficking and slavery in supply chains, 3) requires direct 
suppliers to certify that materials are incorporated into the product comply with applicable laws 
regarding human trafficking and slavery, 4) maintains internal accountability standards and 
procedures for employees or contractors, 5) provides employees who have direct responsibility 
for supply chain management training on human trafficking and slavery.87 
There is no private remedy for failure to comply with this law – the only remedy for a 
violation of this section is an action brought by the Attorney General for injunctive relief.88 The 
required disclosure must be posted on the company’s website with a “conspicuous and easily 
understood link to the required information.”89 If a company does not have a website, it shall 
provide consumers with written disclosure within 30 days of receiving a request for information 
from a consumer.90 The fact that the law requires a response within 30 days of receiving a 
request from a “consumer” and the fact that disclosure is required on a prominent place on the 
company’s website highlights one of the apparent differences between the California Act and 
Section 1502. The California Act appears to be targeted toward affecting the behavior of 
consumers given that making the information readily in a conspicuous place is a priority. In 
contrast, Section 1502 requires disclosure on Form SD which will be filed with the SEC and will 
be available online from the SEC, which suggests investors are the intended target.91 
Interestingly, the California Act does not require a company to do anything other than 
disclose what it is already doing to combat human rights abuses. As discussed supra, rather than 
impose an affirmative obligation to verify that the supply chain contains neither of these, the law 
                                                      
87 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(c) (West 2013). 
88 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(d) (West 2013). 
89 Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(b) (West 2013). 
90 Id. 
91 Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,301. 
19 
 
simply requires a company to disclose what it is currently doing. Essentially, a company could 
comply by doing very little, or nothing and disclosing that fact. 
This provision is clearly a pure “name-and-shame” provision that is intended to 
“encourage” compliance from companies by informing the public about the company’s efforts. 
The only real power behind this law comes from if companies comply for fear of a public outcry. 
A publication by the law firm Jones Day seems to put it best, “A company theoretically could 
simply state that it does not take any action and still be in compliance with the Act. However, the 
negative public relations consequences of such a response may far outweigh the costs of 
implementation.”92 
b. How much will this cost? 
Because the California law does not contain a specific prohibition or specific affirmative 
duties for companies, the cost of implementation is not easily measured in billions of dollars in 
the same way Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The author was not able to locate a direct 
cost estimate for this law and the companies effected. However, because the law is primarily a 
disclosure of existing efforts, numerous costs would likely come from having internal employees 
document the efforts that are already being taken. These costs are likely difficult to measure 
because those employees likely represent fixed costs – they would be employed by companies 
regardless of if the California Act was in force or not. Compliance would merely represent a 
reallocation of existing resources. Further, it seems difficult to assess the compliance costs as 
they would vary widely from company to company based on existing efforts, the number of 
employees involved, the complexity of the company’s supply chains, and related factors. Some 
                                                      
92Jones Day, California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: New Disclosure Requirements for Companies Doing 
Business in California to Take Effect January 1, 2012, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (Nov. 2011), available at:  
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/2d2aa656-db14-4227-aec6-
3464b6a117ea/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/173da43b-5ea6-4fe3-aafe-
38c5cb6bb1e1/California%20Transparency.pdf 
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companies may also expand their current efforts in combating human rights abuses in response to 
the law, however because efforts vary widely between companies this cost would be difficult to 
quantify in financial terms. 
These estimated costs are, of course, excluding the potential costs of hiring outside 
counsel, consultants, or related service-providers to help facilitate compliance with these laws. 
Depending on a company’s internal capabilities, the need for outside help may add significant 
costs. 
c. Will this work? 
As discussed supra, the California law requires only that companies disclose their efforts 
and relies entirely on public opinion as an enforcement mechanism. But do enough members of 
the public actually feel strongly enough about preventing and reducing human rights abuses that 
they will review multiple company’s disclosure reports and adjust their behavior according to 
which companies have the most comprehensive efforts to eradicate human rights abuses? Would 
these people have done their own research anyway? The author was unable to locate empirical 
research relating to the content of a company’s disclosure report and the potential growth or 
shrinkage in earnings or reduction in the company’s stock price. No doubt such a report may 
eventually be produced when more data is available, but for the time being an anecdotal 
exploration of a related incident seems useful. 
The National Public Radio Program This American Life ran a story by a contributor about 
potential labor abuses committed by a major Apple Corporation supplier, Foxconn.93 The story, 
later retracted when it was found to have significant fabrications, detailed the ways in which 
Foxconn employees are forced to work in poor conditions, the ways in which minors may be 
                                                      
93 James Poniezwozik, This American Life’s Apple Retraction: The Danger of Truthiness, TIME (March 26, 2012), 
available at: http://entertainment.time.com/2012/03/16/this-american-lifes-apple-retraction-the-danger-of-truthiness. 
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employed illegally, and the potential poisoning of workers due to lax conditions.94 More than a 
quarter million people signed a petition condemning these practices.95 All signs pointed to 
problems for the famed tech company. It seems as though investor and consumer outrage would 
be consistent with the desired results under with the California Act or Section 1502, which seem 
to seek to use disclosure to effect behavior in this particular way. While there was much outcry 
initially about the abuses detailed in the story, large parts of the story were later discredited.96 It 
does not appear that any sort of backlash ever appeared for Apple, however, despite the fact that 
even without the fabrications contained in the This American Life story, there were still 
numerous abuses detailed at Foxconn plants which produce Apple products. 
Many of the abuses in the story had been detailed by other media outlets at other times. 
The New York Times detailed the ways in which Foxconn mistreats its workers in many of the 
same ways described in the This American Life story. The Times article plainly states, “[u]nder-
age workers have helped build Apple’s products, and the company’s suppliers have improperly 
disposed of hazardous waste and falsified records, according to company reports and advocacy 
groups that, within China, are often considered reliable, independent monitors.”97 The article 
further points out that Apple had been warned about these conditions.98 Apple said in 2012 that it 
was making significant strides in improving factories.99 
The information about Apple’s abuses was covered by the Times and was, and still is, 
readily available on the internet. However, over the year 2012, despite the fact that information 
                                                      
94 Erik Sherman, “This American Life Apple” Kerfuffle is Nonsense, CBS MONEY WATCH (March 19, 2012), 
available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-57399856/this-american-life-apple-kerfuffle-is-nonsense./ 
95 Ian Sheer, et. al., Radio Show Pulls Expose on Apple, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 19, 2012), available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577285713362126158.html. 
96 Id. 
97 Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs are Built into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, (January 25, 
2012), available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-
workers-in-china.html?_r=0. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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was available about Apple’s potentially significant human rights abuses, Apple’s share price did 
not decrease.100 In fact, Apple’s shares started around $400 in January 2012 and climbed to more 
than $700 a share in October 2012 before settling around $550 in the last quarter of 2012.101 The 
stock was up more than 31% and enjoyed stronger performance than 2011.102 
The logic of the California Transparency in Supply Chain Act is that if information is 
available on a company’s human rights failings, that company will be punished by consumers 
and investors for those abuses. Apple shows that may not be the case. The information about 
Apple’s potential abuses has been available for quite some time but the vast majority of 
consumers and investors have seemed unwilling to punish Apple in any meaningful way for 
those abuses. It would seem that availability of that information is not enough to change 
consumer and investor behavior. The incident involving This American Life shows that there 
may be an initial outcry when a story like this is reported, however it is difficult to say if that 
effect is lasting given the circumstances of that incident. 
The California Act has laudable goals and, unlike Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, it 
is probably not hugely expensive. Yet, there is little information on its actual practical effect on 
eradicating human rights abuses. While one could argue that because there is little harm, the law 
is probably harmless, it seems worth noting that this law may make it appear as though 
companies are putting effort forward for fixing this issues when they are, in fact, doing very 
little. Later in this paper, alternative and perhaps more effective methods of disclosure will be 
discussed. 
IV. Better Laws, Less Waste 
                                                      
100 Jay Yarrow, Chart of the Day: Surprise! Apple’s 2012 was Better than Its 2011, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 2, 
2013), available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-apple-stock-performance-2013-1. 
101 Id. 
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What follows is a discussion of the potential ways in which the above-discussed laws could 
be improved, rewritten, or replaced to accomplish the same goals but more effectively. 
A. Great Expense and Worthy Goals 
As previously discussed, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act represents a huge added 
financial burden for many companies. By all estimates, the compliance costs will reach into the 
billions of dollars and yet the benefits of this law are not as clear as its advocates would like to 
argue. Similarly, the California Act may also be marginally expensive and will produce 
questionable, if any, benefits. 
This is not to say, however, that the goals of these laws are not worthy. Eradicating 
human rights abuse is a worthy goals that should be pursued. Ignoring the debate about whether 
these issues should be pursued at a corporate level as opposed to a political or religious level, 
there appear to be more effective and efficient ways of attempting to accomplish those goals. The 
following proposals borrow from other areas of law and policy to attempt to craft more effective 
means accomplishing the same goals. 
B. Alternatives 
The proposals for more effective corporate-related law in this area, discussed below, are 
intended to begin a discussion about the ways in which laws can be used to effectively help 
combat human rights abuses. These are not perfect suggestions and are not intended as polished, 
refined policy recommendations. 
i. Improvements to the Current Laws 
There are a number of small steps that could be taken immediately to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the existing laws. One of the most pressing options would seem to 
be the inclusion of de minimis threshold in the final SEC Rule promulgated under Section 1502. 
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As discussed supra, the lack of a de minimis threshold subjects companies in a wide array of 
industries who use conflict minerals incidentally to costly compliance requirements. It would 
also allow the SEC, and the public, to focus on companies who use a vast majority of the conflict 
minerals as opposed to only a small fraction of those minerals. However, the inherent difficulty 
with policing these minerals is that they are almost always used in very, very small amounts. 
 The California Act could also be improved by some kind of standardization of the ways 
in which companies present information in their required disclosures. The author reviewed a 
number of disclosures in preparing this paper.103 Each presents information in a different way 
with a differing length with different terminology. These documents often read as though they 
were marketing documents As much as possible, it would be helpful if this information were 
presented in a standard format which would allow those interested consumers to easily compare 
the human rights efforts of various companies. A good example for standardized disclosure 
documents would be any of the SEC required reporting schedules. For instance, SEC Form 13D 
provides information in an easily organized way that would allow a consumer to compare 
ownership information from different companies on the same form, or to view a single 
                                                      
103 See generally Gap Inc., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (SB 657), GAP INC. SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (2013), available at: 
http://www.gapinc.com/content/csr/html/OurResponsibility/governance/SB657.html, “Gap Inc. has a Code of 
Vendor Conduct (COVC or “code”) that all of our branded apparel vendors must abide by, which explicitly states 
that forced labor of any kind is strictly prohibited. Our COVC and the enforcement behind it is an important 
mechanism that brings our Human Rights Policy to life within our supply chain.”.  
 
See also IBM, IBM Response to the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, IBM RESPONSIBILITY (Jan. 3, 
2012), available at: http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/response.html, (“As members of the Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (EICC), IBM and other member firms have demonstrated our commitment to environmental 
and social responsibility. Since 2004, IBM (and the EICC) has built upon the Code of Conduct which prohibits the 
use of forced, bonded, indentured labor or involuntary prison labor.”). 
 
See also J. Crew, California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, J. CREW SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2013), available 
at: http://www.jcrew.com/flatpages/social_res_april4.jsp, (“The Responsible Sourcing Program at J.Crew is in place 
to clearly communicate our expectations to our suppliers and to monitor and improve working conditions at the 
facilities that manufacture products for J.Crew…”). 
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company’s information in an organized, familiar way. These allow a consumer to compare 
companies from different industries with vastly different supply chains quickly and easily.  
Further, the disclosure documents for the California Act could contain different categories of 
compliance. For instance, when discussing audits of the supply chain for the presence of human 
trafficking and forced labor, there could be different, standardized classifications for the type of 
audit conducted: supplier certification of the absence of forced labor, internal audit for the 
presence of forced labor, independently verified internal audit, or third-party audit. These 
categories would further simplify the dissemination of information for consumers. 
ii. Human Rights Labeling 
Perhaps part of the problem with the way the California Law currently exists is that it 
requires a consumer who wants to research a company’s reputation on human rights issues to go 
to the company’s website and read about its efforts to human rights abuses, and to then go to 
another company’s website and read about its efforts repeating the process until the consumer 
has enough information to make an informed buying decision. These reports are non-standard 
and often seem difficult to compare. Even if a consumer cares a moderate amount about these 
issues, there is a barrier to effectively using that information as planning and forethought would 
be required. For instance, a comparison of the J. Crew and Gap disclosures shows that the 
current form of these disclosures is of little value as many companies simply write that they are 
attempting to eradicate human trafficking in some generic, vague way.104 There are no concrete, 
                                                      
104 The California Act sets out a list of five requirements that companies must meet in their disclosure statements. 
Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(c) (West 2013). A comparison of GAP’s response  and J. Crew’s response to the first 
requirement helps to show the value, or lack thereof, in these disclosure reports. The first requirement is, “Engages 
in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery. The 
disclosure shall specify if the verification was not conducted by a third party.” Cal.Civ.Code § 1714.43(c) (West 
2013).  
GAP’s disclosure provides, “Gap Inc. monitors nearly 100 percent of the garment factories that produce Gap Inc. 
branded apparel. We verify our product supply chains through both announced and unannounced visits to measure 
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quantitative metrics contained in the requirements of the California Act. Instead, GAP, J. Crew, 
and many others opt for marketing-style prose to describe their efforts. Further, it seems likely 
that the people willing to do such research would also likely be the people who would do such 
research regardless of the California law. 
While a consumer may not be willing to specifically research companies before 
shopping, it seems more likely that consumers would be willing to consider human rights factors 
if they were presented during the shopping experience. For instance, say only the most die-hard 
consumers would be willing to research if a brand of tuna was dolphin safe before going to the 
grocery store. However, many consumers would be willing to check the label of a tuna brand 
before purchasing to make sure it is dolphin safe. In the same way, many consumers may not 
research if a vegetable company uses pesticides or if a meat company uses antibiotics before 
going to the grocery store, but those same consumers will buy groceries labeled “organic” and 
“antibiotic-fee” if given the chance.  
The same kind of idea could theoretically apply to other products and human rights 
abuses. A label could indicate that particular goods were produced in compliance with strict 
human rights standards. In this way, consumers would be able to gather the relevant information 
quickly, at the point of purchase, without the added barrier of needing to consider the need for 
                                                                                                                                                                              
factories’ compliance with our Code of Vendor Conduct, which includes strict prohibition of ‘forced labor … or 
involuntary labor of any kind.’” Gap Inc., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (SB 657), GAP INC. 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2013), available at: 
http://www.gapinc.com/content/csr/html/OurResponsibility/governance/SB657.html 
J. Crew’s disclosure provides, “We have a robust Responsible Sourcing Program in place to evaluate and address 
risks in our supply chain, including the risk of slavery and human trafficking. We have two full-time associates 
dedicated to social responsibility, and we partner with leading independent organizations to implement various 
aspects of our program, including conducting factory inspections, trainings and remediation in the facilities that 
produce our goods…All new factories are subject to inspection before any purchase orders are placed. Existing 
factories are typically inspected every 12 to 24 months unless follow-up is required, in which case we will inspect 
more frequently. “J. Crew, California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, J. CREW SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2013), 
available at: http://www.jcrew.com/flatpages/social_res_april4.jsp. 
27 
 
this information before arriving at the store. There would not need to be a label to indicate that a 
good was produced with forced labor – the lack of a label indicating otherwise would likely be 
enough. 
There would be numerous ways to certify that a product is “human rights friendly.” There 
could be voluntary standards with third-party auditing companies such as with organic food that 
would certify consumer goods. There could be a government agency that would review a 
company’s efforts and certify that they were human rights friendly. Or, if not a standalone 
agency, there could be specific requirements for labeling products as human rights abuse free 
and companies could label their products with this distinction, but there would be penalties for 
non-compliance. 
It doesn’t seem unreasonable to say that given the choice between a good produced using 
slave labor and one produced not using slave labor, most Americans could chose the good 
produced in a human rights friendly way. The California Act attempts to give consumers the 
ability to make these informed decisions, however the barriers to using that information appear 
to be too high for most Americans. Making this information readily accessible at the point of 
purchase would make it more effective, and would do more to further the aims of the law. 
The concept of labeling products could also be applied to conflict minerals under Section 
1502. As discussed above, it seems that the requirements for Section 1502 are primarily intended 
to target investors as there does not appear to be emphasis on making the information readily 
available to consumers. It seems unlikely that all but the most devoted consumers will research a 
company’s Form SD disclosure reports to determine if they are conflict mineral free prior to 
entering the store to purchase those products. If products were labeled as “conflict-mineral” free 
in stores, consumers may choose products with this distinction when compared next to products 
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without such a distinction. Many consumers may oppose the use of conflict minerals and may 
oppose human rights abuses but may not have time to research the ways in which various 
companies treat these issues. Labeling offers consumers the opportunity to make informed 
decisions without creating a barrier of research that would come with an online or SEC 
disclosure. 
While this labeling may be useful from a human rights perspective, there may also be 
commercial benefits for companies who chose to include this labeling. This kind of labeling 
could be particularly useful for companies who exist in largely commoditized industries where 
consumers have trouble differentiating between competing products. Where a consumer does not 
have strong brand loyalty, conflict-free or human rights violation-free labeling may be enough to 
swing a consumer’s decision to purchase a particular product. 
iii. Tax Incentives 
Though decried by many who advocate for the use of the free market, tax incentives are often 
used to achieve what are deemed to be socially or politically desirable goals. It seems like in 
preventing human rights abuses tax incentives could be used to help. 
For instance, presumably without human rights concerns a company would only seek 
primarily to minimize the total landed cost of the minerals needed to produce its products. 
Disincentive for the use of conflict minerals could easily be offered by subjecting any and all 
materials from any of the Conflict Countries to a prohibitively high tariff. If the price of these 
minerals were held artificially high, companies would naturally seek less-expensive minerals 
from non-Conflict Countries.105 
                                                      
105 It would, of course, be an issue for the Departments of State and Defense to ensure the money actually went to 
humanitarian efforts as opposed to the conflicts. 
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Making these taxes effective, however, would require careful consideration and calibration of 
the incentives involved. The current tax system appears to attempt to accomplish this goal but 
given the current state of conflict mineral trading and the need for Section 1502, it appears the 
tariff system has failed. Currently, a container of tin ore from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo costs $6,500 whereas the same container of tin would cost $200 if exported from 
Rwanda.106 This means that many minerals are often transported to a different country before 
being exported.107 Shannon Raj in Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the 
Legislation That Could Cleanse The Trade, wisely suggests that a regional tariff would eliminate 
this incentive for smuggling and would help ensure greater transparency.108 This idea seems 
wise, especially if the money gathered from these tariffs is used to support humanitarian efforts 
in the Congo and the other Covered Countries. 
The idea of a tax penalty for buying conflict minerals could be especially effective if coupled 
with a tax incentive for not doing so. Tax incentives also could be given to companies that 
voluntarily produce their products with non-conflict minerals. These kinds of incentives have 
been given, in recent memory, to all kinds industries and products from Hollywood films to plug 
in electric scooters to a special tax on rum imports that is used to support the American rum 
industry.109 Companies who use non-conflict minerals and have that information confirmed by a 
third-party auditor could receive a deduction for the amount of the minerals purchased or a 
percentage thereof, or some related issue. While the mechanics of such an incentive are beyond 
the scope of this paper, the main idea is using the tax system to disincentive the use of conflict 
                                                      
106 Shannon Raj, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation That Could Cleanse the Trade, 
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 1031 (2011). 
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109 Brad Plumer, From NASCAR to Rum, the 10 Weirdest Parts of the “Fiscal Cliff” Bill, THE WASHINGTON POST 
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30 
 
minerals and incentive the use of non-conflict minerals. This is not to say that such an incentive 
structure will solve the underlying reason for the conflict, or even lessen the conflict. It would 
simply offer a more effective incentive structure than the current laws. However, such a tax 
structure may be subject to the same unintended consequences as discussed above. 
This same idea could also be applied to human trafficking and forced labor. If a company 
could find a third-party audit which certifies its supply chain is free of human trafficking and 
forced labor, the company could be allowed certain favorable tax attributes. This may be difficult 
to measure and may result in false claims of human rights abuse free products, however the idea 
would be to create a further financial incentive for companies to avoid these kinds of labor. 
These incentives may also help defer the financial costs of eradicating forced labor and human 
trafficking in the supply chain. 
iv. Changing the culture 
Both the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act and Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act are supposed to work because of the “name-and-shame” nature of each – when companies 
are forced to disclose their use of conflict minerals, or lack of efforts to eradicate human 
trafficking, in their supply chains, they will lose customers. Apple’s potential human rights 
abuses have been long decried in the media but the company has not yet paid a price for those 
abuses in terms of sales or support.  
What would perhaps be more effective than requiring corporations to disclose potential 
abuses in their supply chains would be efforts to encourage consumers to become more educated 
about the goods and services they purchase. Much of the information that such “name-and-
shame” provisions would require is already available, but consumers are not aware of it or do not 
actively make it part of their buying decisions. While not necessarily a government or  corporate 
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initiative, such an effort to change the culture of American consumers to place a greater 
emphasis on supply chain transparency may be effective. 
A forthcoming law review article suggests that consumers will continue to demand greater 
supply chain transparency, regardless of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.110 While it may be 
true that activist shareholder groups and human rights activists may continue to demand supply 
chain transparency, it does not appear that the vast majority of American consumers will demand 
such information, or will allow their behavior to be affected by the availability of such 
information. 
Rather than focusing on increased corporate disclosure, efforts to curb these abuses should 
instead focus on increasing consumer awareness about these issues. Raising awareness could 
potentially change consumer culture and behavior in the United States as social norms changed 
to reflect an increase emphasis on social responsibility. Such an increase in awareness would 
impact consumer behavior, which would create natural market incentives for companies to 
eliminate these abuses. The use of this natural market incentive would mean the eradication of 
these abuses would be accomplished by the free market in an efficient manner and that 
companies who engaged in these abuses would be punished by consumers. 
V. What can companies do? 
Returning to the discussion started at the beginning of this paper about the increase 
complexity and risk of global supply chains, the new name-and-shame provisions of the afore-
discussed laws seem to only complicate the already complex and burdensome task of managing 
the global supply chain. 
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While it may not be true that American consumers will continue to push for supply chain 
transparency, it appears that American policy makers may continue to do so in an attempt to 
appear as though they are working to resolve humanitarian crises. Because of this, companies 
should continue to prepare for increasing disclosure requirements and begin to adjust their 
supply chains accordingly. Increase awareness and deeper supply chain knowledge may help 
companies comply with current and future laws. Even if that is not the case, this increase 
compliance will help companies identify potential problems in their supply chains sooner and 
therefore minimize potential costs. 
In fact, there is evidence to suggest a number of leading companies appear to be increasing 
their efforts to remove conflict minerals from their supply chains, possibly as a preemptive 
measure for future issues. According to a recent report by a human rights advocacy group, The 
Enough Project, a number of leading companies have increase their efforts in recent years to 
remove conflict minerals from their supply chains.111 The report notes that these companies, 
including Intel, HP, AMD, Acer, Dell, Apple and Microsoft, have all significantly improved 
their efforts.112 The report, issued in 2012, notes that these companies have worked to reduce 
their use of conflict minerals despite delays in the SEC’s promulgation of a rule related to 
Section 1502.113 
In addition to any humanitarian benefits of reducing the amount of conflict minerals in a 
supply chain, there is also the added benefit of risk mitigation that comes with removing these 
minerals from one’s supply chain. The Covered Countries for which Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank act applies, as well as the types of countries in which human rights abuses are prevalent 
                                                      
111Sasha Lezhnev & Alex Hellmuth, Taking Conflict Out of Consumer Gadgets: Company Rankings on Conflict 
Minerals 2012, THE ENOUGH PROJECT (Aug. 2012), available at: 
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CorporateRankings2012.pdf. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
33 
 
are also countries where political unrest would be more likely to disrupt a supply chain. For this 
reason, humanitarian concerns aside, companies should begin to reduce their footprint in these 
countries. 
VI. Conclusion 
Even before Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the California Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act, many companies were experiencing difficulty in managing their supply chains and 
see the need for deeper supply chain knowledge. These laws introduce additional complexity and 
expense to already imperfect supply chains which will add significant compliance costs. While 
the goals of the law are inherently good, and while deeper supply chain knowledge would 
arguably be a positive thing for many companies, the requirements of each law lead to sub-
optimization for both the involved companies and involved humanitarian issues. The compliance 
costs of Section 1502 are astronomical, while the benefits expressed a means of affecting 
consumer behavior may be questionable. Though less expensive, the benefits of the California 
Act are also questionable. In short, these laws are inherently good ideas with inherently poor 
execution. 
In addition to being ineffective, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act also comes dangerously 
close to invading the domain of the states by attempting to regulate the ways in which 
corporations do business. While it does this though the guise of disclosure as opposed to actual 
regulation, it is clear that the law runs afoul of the purpose of the 1934 Act and the traditional 
mission of the SEC. Though the California Act  
As discussed, there are a variety of ways that these laws could be replaced or improved. 
There are, of course, also a variety of policies ideas for how to address the root causes of the use 
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of conflict minerals, forced labor and other humanitarian issues that do not involve corporate 
law.  
Perhaps the most helpful recommendation for US companies would be to encourage lobbying 
and education efforts for the public to have these laws replaced by policies that will actually 
attack the root causes of these human rights abuses as opposed to making corporations expend 
efforts to create the appearance that something is being done about the problem. If the goal of 
these laws is to alter consumer behavior, any laws enacted should work in ways that will actually 
impact consumer on a widespread level. If the goal of these laws is to affect investor behavior, 
the laws put in place should offer a direct or indirect financial means of making these less 
appealing investments.  
